

## Solidarity Economy Initiatives in Turkey: From Reciprocity to Local Development?

Olivier Gajac<sup>1</sup> and Selin Pelek<sup>2+</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Galatasaray University, Department of Sociology

<sup>2</sup> Galatasaray University, Department of Economics

**Abstract.** *The emergence of solidarity economy initiatives in Turkey could be considered as a result of the historical process of the 1980s and the strengthened neoliberal policies over the past two decades. In this context, the disengagement and decentralization of the State, as well as the rise of civil society, challenges the role of the solidarity economy initiatives in territorial development. Are they integrated into the governance and regulation of their field of activity? Rather than a total disengagement, Turkey has been marked by a concentration of power and government control over many sectors and strong interdependence of civil society organizations. By targeting six activity fields (short food circuit, education, popular university, construction, refugees, and consumption without purchase), we conducted 25 interviews and a two-day workshop with the members of the solidarity initiatives. According to our findings, these initiatives have emerged outside of the market and public authorities. The social movements that occurred over the past years have significant effects on their emergence. Faced with the reluctance and/or rejection by the public authorities, most of them are characterized by a form of autonomy and self-organization capacity in their emergence phase. While in the beginning, they were based on the reciprocity principle, they aim to be consolidated by the market and non-market resources in the next phase. Finally, the solidarity economy initiatives would provide a basis for civic or citizen governance through their network ties and could have a positive impact in terms of social, economic, cultural, and local development.*

**Keywords:** local development, reciprocity, solidarity economy

**JEL Codes:** Q01, I31, Z13

### 1. Introduction

The hegemonic status of the neoliberal paradigm has been widely discredited in the face of economic, social, and ecological crisis. Alternative ways of production, consumption, and economic organization have drawn increasing attention as a potential solution to market failures. In this context, the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) has made significant progress in many countries. Turkey is not an exception. A wide range of solidarity economy initiatives has been created recently, and they have gained popularity in various areas. In this paper, we examine their characteristics in terms of volunteering, reciprocity, democracy, resources, and capacity to contribute to local networks and development process.

While social entrepreneurship in Turkey is much older than those studied in this paper, we focus on their roles and schemes resulting from the interaction of current economic, political, and social conditions. Associated with a process of deeper individualization and significant challenges experienced over the last decades, these new solidarity economy initiatives raise the question about the links between social movements and solidarity economy. On this basis, we observe that they take shape in local contexts and emerge through mutual aid in various forms.

---

<sup>+</sup> Corresponding author: E-mail address: [pelekselin@gmail.com](mailto:pelekselin@gmail.com).

As in many Western countries, the intermediary bodies that inherited by modern society have been found historically between private and state spheres in Turkey. These intermediaries between society and State have been playing an essential role in terms of redistribution of resources and social welfare. Although some of them, such as *Vakıfs* (foundations), had been present from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, they have emerged mainly from the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries in the context of modernization. However, the "new" solidarity economy initiatives, established since the 2000s, or to put it differently in the neoliberal area, draw attention in their changing characteristics. The analysis of their emergence requires the understanding of these initiatives in terms of their organizational, political, and economic dynamics.

In this paper, we seek to explore the solidarity economics in Turkey through an analysis of *collective action*. This approach enables us to take into account the actors, their aspirations, their innovations, and the institutional context in which the new solidarity networks are embedded as well. Within this framework, we aim to examine the variety of the initiatives, their perspectives of social change, and their potential impacts on local development. To our knowledge, there is no previous study addressing to new dynamics of solidarity initiatives in Turkey. However, the topics related to the social economy (cooperatives), social action and social policies (associations and foundations), and public policy (women, dwelling, administrative decentralisation) are instructive and provide a basis in explaining the main political and social structure where the new solidarity economy initiatives are integrated.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology used to assess the research questions. Section 3 addresses the relationship between solidarity economy and local development. In section 4, the interrelations between solidarity economy initiatives and social movements are discussed. Section 5 introduces the hybrid model of the initiatives in terms of resources and analyses their mechanisms of solidarity to overcome their fragility in the face of an unfavourable ecosystem. The last section concludes with the prospects for potential contributions of the solidarity economy initiatives to civic or local governance development.

## 2. Research Methodology<sup>1</sup>

For this study, we have targeted a number of solidarity economy initiatives that have emerged in Turkey since the 2000s. These initiatives are located in different cities and/or regions, such as Istanbul, Izmir, Sirince, Ankara, Gaziantep, Eskisehir, Kocaeli, Hatay, Duzce, and Artvin. They operate in several fields, namely short food circuit, education, popular university, construction, refugees, and consumption without purchase. They are relatively heterogeneous in terms of scope and size. Some of them are numerous in the same economic activity, while others may be limited to a smaller number without spreading to the national level.

We have used different qualitative survey methods from September 2017 to March 2019. As a first step, we have conducted 25 semi-structured interviews. As a second step, we have used the social intervention method through a two-day workshop with the participation of actors of these solidarity economy initiatives from different regions of Turkey. In total, we met with forty-eight actors involved in twenty-three solidarity economy initiatives. In addition to the interviews, this workshop enabled the actors to develop a transversal analysis, both with actors invested in the same sector and/or in different fields as well. During the workshop, their motivations, their historical evolutions, their resources in terms of funding and human capital, the

---

<sup>1</sup> We would like to thank Alin Karabel and Eylem Güner for their contribution to this AUF-funded research project as part of their internship at the Social Science Research Center (TAM) of Galatasaray University under the supervision of the professor-researcher, Olivier Gajac.

organizational structure of the initiatives, the difficulties that they have encountered, and their future prospects have been discussed in detail.

For the data analysis, we have focused on the contents of interviews as well as the exchange of experiences between the actors. In fact, we have sought to analyze these solidarity initiatives within a cross-sectoral context without excluding the singularities of their field. In this study, we chose to call them according to their activity field and not to use their real names for the sake of confidentiality.

### **3. Solidarity Economy and Local Development**

The link between the solidarity economy and local development requires addressing certain concepts. First of all, the notion of local development has appeared in the 1980s in the face of limited macroeconomic policies. Rising inequalities and the deterioration of the environment have unveiled the inefficacy of these policies and have led to citizen awareness. The emergence of new social movements has formed within this framework (Pecqueur, 1989, 14-15). In view of this fact, local development has been conceived as a promising tool to involve public authorities, private actors, and civil society. However, the notion of civil society has remained relatively vague and imprecise and has been characterized by challenging the market and State (Vatin, 2011, 51, Otayek, 2002, 194, Rangeon, 1986, 9), the originality of their mobilization, often perceived in a marginal way, tends to show a political content rather than an economic one (Demoustier and Richez-Battesti, 2010, 8-10)

On the other hand, the solidarity economy which does not differ from social economy entities in having recourse to the same legal status as cooperatives, mutual societies and associations, stands out in the sense that it would bring both a socio-economic and socio-political dimensions (Klein, Laville, Moulaert, 2017, 14, Laville, 2013, 74, Demoustier and Richez-Battesti, 2010, 8-10). Solidarity economy would tend to re-embed the economy in society using the reciprocity principle. It would seek to democratize the economy by proposing innovations and / or alternatives of goods and services that the market and State would not be able to enforce (Laville and Cattini, 2006, 303 ; Laville, Magnen, Carvalho de França Filho, Medieros, 2005, 11, Chaniel and Laville, 2005, 68).

While solidarity economy initiatives in Turkey tend to promote this socio-economic dimension by formulating economic alternatives to the market and State, the socio-political dimension must be nuanced. As many authors highlight, the internal democratic functioning of solidarity economy initiatives must be extended to actors in its environment, such as public authorities and private actors. In this respect, Laurent Gardin reminds us that the recognition of public power is essential to get solidarity-based economic initiatives out of a certain fragility linked to a functioning based on only non-monetary resources, i.e., the principle of reciprocity (2006, 79). In a sense, their future might depend on the evolution of forms of public regulation (Chaniel, Laville, 2005, 48).

Moreover, this socio-political dimension seems important if we are interested in better understanding the link between the solidarity economy and territory<sup>2</sup>. While some authors have highlighted in the 2000s that this issue received little attention in understanding the role of social and solidarity economy organizations in relation to the territory (Demoustier and Richez-Battesti, 2010, 9), this would not be the case today. As such, States would have less and less of monopoly power on the implementation of public policies in the context of globalization (Laville, Magnen, Carvalho de França Filho, Medieros, 2005, 11). As Chevallier argues, the

---

<sup>2</sup> In the context of the re-territorialization of the space of public action, i.e. the establishment of new entities for public policy intervention and a redefinition of the territories of public action (metropolitan areas or agglomeration, countries, regional development agencies), "The territory appears as an active entity that draws its development potential from its local resources, understood in the broad sense, i.e. with its activities, its actors, its networks..." (Leloup, Moyart and Pecqueur 2005, 322-323).

modern state tends to be double-sided by a supra-national logic such as the EU and a regional logic. In other words, it is more likely to use a greater diversity of actors to meet the needs of the community (2008, 46-52). Therefore, "Governance encourages public authorities to initiate and lead different stakeholders in the collective action which according to Petrella and Richez-Battesti can be embodied in a plurality of governance regimes"<sup>3</sup> (2010, 54-57).

In addition to the fact that most countries have implemented reforms in favour of a process of deconcentration and decentralization, Turkey is not exempt from this trend of reforms in favour of a greater transfer of responsibilities to the local authorities. It is sufficient to mention the territorial reforms in favour of metropolitan municipalities in 1984 and 2004, departments in 2005 and regional development agencies in 2006 (Bayraktar, Massicard, 2011, 18-33). In this context, some authors show that the contribution of solidarity economy initiatives in the new territorial and institutional compromises could be measured via governance and regulation (Demoustier and Richez-Battesti, 2010, 8). In this manner, local public authorities would be more encouraged to establish local public action governance than general public policy. The term public action here means that local public policies would be based more on the principle of participatory democracy, while the term public policy derives from centralization of decisions intended to be implemented throughout a country or territory (Leloup, Moyart and Pecqueur 2005, 322).

In France since the 1970s, the State has delegated some of its responsibilities to associations as part of the general interest. However, it has been shown that these associations tend to be isomorphic in their relationship with the public authorities because of increasingly restrictive regulations on their functioning (Di Maggio, Powel, 1983, 150). In fact, associative organizations have been confronted with new public management, putting them in increasing competition with each other through the imposition of norms and standards within a context of reduced public spending. This trend is also found among social economy organizations that have become more or less institutionalized for the purposes of State and/or the market within the framework of the welfare state (Eme, 1999, 28). According to some authors, by participating in the general interest, they have reduced the socio-political dimension with regard to public power (Chanial, Laville, 2005, 63).

From this point of view, solidarity economy organizations as a more recent movement differ from social economy organizations in that the latter are characterized by their heavy structure and their low capacity to renew themselves in the face of public power (Angeon and Laurol, 2006, 19-20), even if some experiences show that they are able to re-apply for their original project and regain a new legitimacy (Laville, Salomon, 2015, 15-23, Espagnet, 2015, 98-104, Haeringer, 2002, p. 46)). In Turkey, but also elsewhere, as Youssef Sadik (2015) points out, there is a trend towards the institutionalization of intermediate actors and a strong interdependence between associations and public authorities in favour of strengthening the prerogatives of the State.

In fact, the case of Turkey has not been marked by a total disengagement of the State, but rather a political re-hierarchization of the territory (Massicard, 2014, 8). In this framework, the intermediate actors are considered as palliative elements between the State and the market. Thus, the recent emergence of the local solidarity economy initiatives aimed at democratizing the economy does not seem to be moving towards the implementation of territorial development in which these initiatives would be involved in the governance and regulation of their sectors of intervention. At this stage, they do not participate in the decision-making processes of local authorities' policies (Demoustier and Richez-Battesti, 2010, 7-8). They do not contribute to the specific regulations in their sector of intervention in the sense that their ability to identify new needs with regard to citizens' expectations and aspirations. In sum, they are not recognized as actors of these policies.

---

<sup>3</sup> Such as multilateral, quasi-market, citizenship, tutelary or public governance.

Consequently, although they have a real project to democratize the economy by promoting alternatives of solidarity economy within a strong reciprocity framework, their socio-political dimension is currently in the process of civic logic or, of citizen governance, as suggested by Petrella and Richez-Battesti (2010, 57). This civic logic, by seeking to reintegrate the economy into human relations, is based on pluralities of forms of proximity linked to their environment. In general, these environments are the areas where the actors live in order to meet their expectations and aspirations without finding strong feedback from public authorities and economic actors. In this respect, we would like to examine the emergence of solidarity economy initiatives in Turkey by combining the socio-economic dimension with civic logic.

This approach is based first of all on the emergence of forms of solidarity-based communities whose explanatory factors can be multiple -historical, economic, political, social and cultural- (Itacaina, 2010, 73-74) and on the construction of scalar social networks establishing the first steps of a coordination system. The emergence of solidarity economy initiatives in Turkey would, at this stage, be more in the territorial governance process, which is relied on civic solidarity economy logic without institutional recognition of the State and local public authorities. While there are some signs that they are interested in better understanding the issues that these initiatives would be able to address, it is still difficult to talk about territorial development that includes them in governance and regulation, unless we assume that this civic territorial development (informal or non-institutionalized) is on a transitional path.

#### **4. Challenges, Political Climate, and Commitments**

By looking at the context of Turkey, we must address the issue of the emergence of solidarity economy initiatives within the limits of the economic policies implemented since the 1980s and the legislative and political developments of the past two decades. In Turkey, the economic liberalization under Turgut Ozal's presidency in the 1980s was also marked by the rise of civil society on the political agenda (Groc, 1998, 43). Nevertheless, this liberal phase had tended to take a different direction as soon as the Justice and Development Party (abbreviated as AKP in Turkish) came to power in 2002, when a certain discontent with social progress also gave rise to citizen awareness and a movement of contestations in Turkey. Although the first two terms of AKP government were marked by constitutional reforms (2004, 2007, 2010) in favour of rights and freedoms as a part of the process of accession to the European Union, the political agenda of the AKP was formed by a series of challenges related to policies of privatization, urban renewal and restriction of citizens' freedoms (Telseren, 2014, 38, Gajac, Akyıldız, 2019).

While Turkey has implemented administrative and territorial reforms in favour of the devolution of the State and decentralization to local authorities, this phenomenon has taken place in the context of the withdrawal of the State, which is linked to the neo-liberal economy. Therefore, territorial development would be a promising way to deal with the destructive social and environmental consequences of globalization on the one hand, and more inclusive on the other hand by involving other actors in the implementation of public policies. However, this so-called decentralization has resulted in Turkey through a political re-hierarchization of the territory. Beyond a withdrawal of the State, the latter would consider civil society actors as an ideo-political intermediary to legitimize its power and its maintenance (Gajac, 2018, 150). Whether we are talking about social issues related to violence against women (Ekal, 2013), urban and housing policy issues (Massicard, 2014), according to Élise Massicard, the State, by establishing after 2008 "its control over almost all institutional mechanisms, has shown trends towards centralization as well as increased interventionism in several fields" (2014, 6).

We may note the existence of social protests and mobilizations linked to a concentration of power and public policies, as well as an increase in the plurality of forms of involvement following the Gezi Park

movement (Gajac, Akyıldız, 2019). Some of these initiatives have focused and/or created subsequently have adopted solidarity economy alternatives in several fields such as short food circuit, education, popular university, construction, refugees, and consumption without purchase. This notion is in line with the new issue of the relationship between social movements and solidarity economy, as highlighted by Laville and Pleyers, who points out that social movements are at the origin of solidarity initiatives and that the latter is also at the origin of social movements in favour of economic democracy (2017).

Among the plurality of logics of engagement (politics and advocacy, defense and resistance, mutual aid and movement logic) (Gajac, Akyıldız, 2019) in connection with the protests and social mobilizations, this civic and solidarity momentum has been reinforced at the social level, as it led various groups to share the solidarity experiences during Gezi movement in 2013 (Telseren, 2014, 36-44) and throughout Turkey gave rise to the figure of an individual in solidarity, as Buket Türkmen points out (2016, 121). As a result, individuals increasingly have tended to emancipate themselves, according to the analysis of Bikmen and Meydanoğlu, which indicate that Turkish citizens are more likely to support associations that are part of their social kinship ties (2006, 15). We could thus use the same terminology with Roger Sue to describe counter-society in the sense that individuals, by rethinking themselves, others, and society, can produce positive outcomes to initiate social change (2016, 10-25).

Established at the local level, these solidarity economy initiatives, which stem from a context marked by social movements and/or are at the origin of a social movement, tend to be based on a logic of mutual aid which, according to Joseph Haeringer, "brings people together to resolve situations" and "does not separate the response from the people who implement it", on the contrary, it promotes symmetrical relations between them. In fact, these relationships call for reciprocity between people and are a long-term process, leading individuals to "pool multiple resources for autonomous care" (2002, 37), where they will be led to contribute to the goals that they set. In this way, this mutual aid movement, which seeks to find the means or its own resources to respond to the difficulties experienced by individuals or other social concerns, would have produced many solidarity economy initiatives that, in their emerging phase, are based on non-monetary resources. This reciprocity at the heart of these solidarity economy initiatives corroborates the idea of the solidarity economy to subordinate the market and the State in the provision of goods and services.

## **5. From Reciprocity to Solidarity Economy Initiatives**

While, as we have seen, citizens have taken up new social challenges with regard to their aspirations and expectations and have undertaken solidarity economy initiatives through a logic of mutual aid, based mainly on their emergence phase on reciprocity, these initiatives are at the heart of critical thinking that opens up fields of possibilities in a context dominated by the liberal economy (Hillenkamp, Laville, 2013, 129). As Jacques Ion points out, while "(...) protests are always organized in collective actions, (...) the period is mainly marked by the coexistence of multiple forms of engagement" that do not follow the same aims and reasons (2017, 117, 2001, 11). In Turkey, solidarity economy initiatives are diverse in the sense that they do not adopt the same statutes, that they operate in several sectors, that they are part of both rural and urban areas, and that they use a multitude of market activities complementary to the principle of reciprocity. On the other hand, although the ecosystem can be a constraint or support for the consolidation of a diversity of solidarity economy initiatives, they are not limited to making an internal criticism of the State and the market, they can also make an external criticism of their field of intervention.

The process of distinguishing their non-monetary economic model in terms of purpose would not only be due to the variables of a constraining or unsupportive ecosystem, but also to the fact that some of them seek recognition by the public authorities and others advocate strong autonomy and self-management, such as in

the case of new economic, social movements (Gendron, 2001). Consequently, we can identify in the medium and long term the differentiation of their economic model of hybridization of the market, non-market, and non-monetary resources in a more or less strong and different relationship between solidarity economy initiatives and public power as well as the market. We will discuss here solidarity economy initiatives in the fields of short food circuit, education, popular university, construction, refugees, and consumption without purchase.

First, we find economic models of resource hybridization using the non-monetary economy and the market economy. This type of domestic-market model is based on the involvement of volunteers in promoting environmentally friendly agriculture, better living conditions for farmers, and more organic food for consumers. In fact, these initiatives, which are found in the field of short food circuit (consumer communities, cooperatives, urban gardens, producer groups, individual intermediaries, direct sale on the farm or via the web), are part of a multilateral reciprocity between several actors (producers, intermediaries, civil society actors, consumers) and offer a paid service linked to the purchase of agricultural products. These multilateral solidarity economy initiatives are built outside the traditional distribution channels and do not really seek institutional recognition, but rather to maintain operational autonomy.

This strong opposition to public power is less significant in the education sector. In these initiatives aimed at providing alternative education to the public and private services which are considered insufficient, families have sought a school model in which the child is at the heart of the educational project and where the well-being of their learning is central, as is that of their awareness of ecological and freedom themes. Indeed, their economic model of hybridization relies mainly on both non-monetary and market resources. Non-monetary resources are based on the central involvement of families as members of the cooperative and volunteers in the extra-curricular activities (administrative tasks, workshop and festival organizations, etc.), but also on external volunteers who are sensitive and interested in this initiative or model for alternative schools. Parents who were originally members of these alternative schools rely more on peer reciprocity by meeting their expectations of parents who wish to send their children to school outside public and private schools. These schools offer a paid service to families, which is the market resource of this resource hybridization model.

Unlike short food circuits, these schools seek recognition from the public authorities in order to be able to offer more scholarships to families and reduce the costs of school fees. While the non-monetary dimension and then the market dimension characterizes the economic model of these alternative schools, they have been able to hire teachers that gradually strengthen their teaching force and recruits skilled technical staff from the very beginning. In this way, the more or less strong attractiveness of these schools, which witnessed an increase in the number of students, pushes them to maintain the commitment of volunteers by a paid staff both in teaching, administrative, and cleaning tasks. This process of professionalization at the expense of volunteers and, therefore, families are, in turn, likely to cause tensions in the process of consolidating these initiatives. However, their foundation outside the public sphere does not lead to a strong conflict with the public authorities, and in the search for recognition of their economic model, they have received a favourable sign from the Ministry of Education, which has granted them the management of four schools.

This demand for recognition by the public authorities seems more difficult to obtain in the field of construction. Following the 1999 earthquake, the residents, by forming a cooperative, challenged the government's decision to claim their right to housing, and opposed the government's proposals and to relocate personally to the private or public park. Following a series of long-term demonstrations that began in 2003 in Ankara, with a 142-day sitting in Abdi Ipekci Park in 2004, the cooperative initiated legal proceedings against the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement in 2005. In 2007, the Administrative Court upheld the residents' claims, and the State provided for the cooperative building land and loans. It is not until July 2012 that the

Social Housing Agency (TOKI) approves the issue of lands such as the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization.

In the framework of this initiative, the residents have turned to a collective self-construction mode while using volunteers, including academics who have supported this project. Here, we find in this emerging process both reciprocity of peers, residents building their own housing collectively, and multilateral reciprocity where academics bring their competence and give advice for the realization of this self-construction project. This economic model of hybridization is based solely on the commitment of the residents and calls only on non-monetary resources for advice and expertise in terms of immaterial investment on the part of the academic community. In fact, although this form of empowerment is dual, political, and economical, the fact remains that the administrative and legal obstacles have been the daily reality of the residents in the face of the public authorities who are very hesitant to support this initiative. In addition to their refusal to be abandoned from a legal point of view, they expressed a desire to remain in their environment and worked collectively to carry out the project in the face of administrative, political and economic resistance. After 18 years of resistance, this initiative received the World Housing Award in 2017 and has the merit of bringing to light an alternative construction model in the face of public housing policies and private actors in the construction sector.

This lack of support from the public authorities is reinforced with regard to the initiatives of popular universities. Many academics lost their jobs after they signed a peace petition, and eleven solidarity collectives were formed to challenge the public and private models of universities in Turkey. Academics who are still employed and/or fired have thought of alternative higher education in Turkey. Among these solidarity collectives, three have succeeded hardly in structuring themselves legally by creating an association or cooperative. In their emergence process, their business model of hybridization relied on volunteers, non-monetary resources, knowing that solidarity funds had been set up outside of their initiative to help those who had lost their jobs.

In addition to the administrative obstacles and insensitivity of most political parties vis-à-vis many academics confronted with injustice, these three solidarity collectives have enabled academics in the form of reciprocity of peers to pursue their teaching activities through workshops, conferences, seminars and summer camps. The particularity of these initiatives has been to offer lessons and debates on various social topics open to the general public. The consolidation of these universities did not come from a recognition of public authority, but from public and private international organizations. In fact, the economic model of hybridization, which was initially based on non-monetary resources, was supplemented and strengthened by international public funds, leading to a hybrid model of non-monetary and non-market resources. However, this hybridization model remains dependent on external public funding, and without the legitimacy of the public authorities or are part of the commercial sphere, it remains very fragile in the long term.

While all these cases tend to be characterized by a cautious recognition or a rejection of public power both in terms of alternative education and university education, the fact remains that solidarity economy initiatives in the field of refugees have found an echo on the part of public authorities and international organizations. Faced with the increasing flow of Syrian refugees due to the civil war in Syria, the open-door policy declared in 2011 by the Turkish government has led the many actors of civil society (national and international) to move towards an aid logic. The awareness of both political and civil society actors that Syrians would remain permanently in Turkey since there has been an ongoing conflict was reflected in legislative reforms and the professionalization of the voluntary sector. As a result, associations or NGOs, either created by municipalities or citizens, have entered into a partnership with donors from several countries such as EU countries, the Middle East, and the United States (Nalbantoğlu, 2018). It appears that the economic model of these actors, initially

marked by voluntary commitment, has been able to find material and even financial investment support from some municipalities in large cities and has been able to fit into the call for project logic of international donors.

Thus, these solidarity economy initiatives involving non-monetary and non-market resources have been pushed to adopt a market logic emanating from international public and private organizations. Whether in their emergence and consolidation phase, civil society actors have introduced a form of unequal reciprocity in the sense that the beneficiaries, the Syrians, do not take part in the provision of the goods and services. With the exception of one association that has placed Syrians at the centre of its project in the provision of their goods and services in favour of greater autonomy and integration of Syrians into economic life and their place of residence, all civil society organizations have sought to make Syrians adapted indirectly to the Turkish economy. The various activities (provision of services in companies, training, service activities at public institutions, company creation, partnership mentoring program) aim to integrate Syrians into the labour market without taking into account their aspirations and professional background. This logic of market integration tends to be limited due to the fact that few Syrians, only 1percent, obtain an employment contract, and the others are hired in the informal sector without social security. In the latter case, civil society actors have been institutionalized into local policies reinforced by national policy guidance, and they have been supported by international organizations to address the hosting of more than three million Syrian refugees.

In addition to this managerial governance of the Syrian crisis, there are many women's initiatives in Turkey, including that of consumption without purchase. They have the particularity of being based on the volunteer commitment, by offering peer and/or multilateral reciprocity, and they support women by involving stakeholders in the goods and services they offer. This solidarity initiative began during the Gezi demonstrations where women (especially from Kadıköy) gathered in a park to organize forums. This commitment has resulted in the sustainability of their collective action, whose objectives are to raise feminist awareness and create solidarity among women. In this regard, they organize weekly debates and discussions on various topics related to women's issues and have set up an initiative to consume goods without purchasing them for women. This solidarity initiative strengthens the links between women and makes them actors of their own future by also meeting some of their material needs.

## **6. Towards local civic development?**

While some authors indicate that local authorities are interested in solidarity economy initiatives (Demoustier, Richez-Battesti, 2010) and that the latter are increasingly recognized as participating in territorial development (Demoustier, 2010), public policies are orienting themselves more towards a greater contribution of various actors in terms of governance (Leloup, Moyart and Pecqueur, 2005). In this way, solidarity economy initiatives would contribute to social, economic and cultural development (Lévesque and Mendell, 2005, Fontaine, 2018), especially when public action frameworks and administrative-territorial reforms invite these actors to play a more important role (Itçaina, 2010, Angeon and Laurol, 2006). If the territory is the driving force behind these economic initiatives (Itçaina, 2010), they enable a spatial construction in which the public power is likely to be a key element in their dynamics, and some of them can also maintain their autonomy or self-organization scheme (Demoustier, Richez-Battesti, 2010).

In Turkey, there is more or less reluctance on the part of public authorities to take these initiatives into account in a territorial development process where they would be integrated in terms of their field of activity into local governance and regulation in terms of public action. Worse still, all solidarity economy initiatives seem to be facing administrative and procedural difficulties in their emerging phase, and some of them have even preferred to adopt an informal format to avoid cumbersome regulations. In the absence of recognition by the public authority in terms of local governance and policy-making mechanisms for better sectoral regulation,

can we conclude that these solidarity economy initiatives do not contribute to local development? In this respect, the recognition of certain solidarity-based economic initiatives by public authorities make them more likely to be geared towards the interests of the State and the market in the question of refugee, or the initiatives for an alternative education could be considered as traditional economic actors of the market.

In any case, they are evolving in Turkey on a local basis and would be appropriate to contribute to the achievement of spatial transformations that do not only follow the aims of power public and market but which formulate a form of autonomy and self-organization as most of these initiatives reveal. Therefore, we witness a citizen or a local civic development. Their impact would be similar to the case that a well-designed public policy involving various actors in the context of territorial development. Despite the reluctance of the public authorities, they have at least one or more effects in terms of social, economic, cultural, and sustainable development. First, by desiring democratic mechanisms, they promote the emancipation of individuals through multiple elective sociabilities (Sue, 2016, 22) and their inherited or community membership. In this way, most of them are in favour of an emancipation of individuals in search of expectation, aspiration and justice, a subjectivity to rethink themselves, and even to emancipate individuals from groups to relationships (Itçaina, 2010, 74) whose social history had linked them to community, village and domestic links as in the case of some short food circuit initiatives.

On the social level, they can internalize the costs and destructive effects of the market and/or public policies by recreating and strengthening social cohesion. Some of them fight against the processes of the vulnerability of social groups (farmers, agricultural workers, refugees), or even respond to urgent problems of injustice. As such, the defense of rights thus translates into the creation of economic activity (education, construction, consumption without purchase) and leads to the realization of the aspirations of certain social movements (Lévesque and Mendell, 2005). In this vein, they have an economic impact by innovating and creating new economic activities such as alternative education, and by revitalizing local productive potential such as in the case of certain short food circuit. In this sense, they produce positive externalities for the territory, especially in the field of alternative education and short food circuits, by enhancing human and natural resources. In fact, some initiatives value the territory as much as individuals. In the field of short food circuit, they contribute to a transformation of natural resources towards sustainable development, and in the field of alternative education, they create value for previously undeveloped human resources.

Most of them are able to create solidarity of geographical and physical proximity (short food circuit, construction, refugee) with several stakeholders in their field of action, but they are not limited to a local approach, since as active actors, almost all initiatives establish trans-local networks at the regional and/or national level. Indeed, some initiatives may be linked to other territories and civil society actors and may also be led to broadening their involvement within their network. These social networks in which the initiatives are engaged to have established formal or informal coordination mechanisms that serve as support for information, sharing, learning, and pursuing their project. They participate in strengthening their initiative and achieving diverse aims in the face of the State and the market by responding to the aspirations, expectations, and demands for justice.

## 7. Conclusion

The emergence of solidarity economy initiatives in Turkey exhibits a form of emancipation of individuals to take up the key issues with respect to their expectations and requests in terms of social justice and law. Resulting from social mobilizations, these solidarity economy initiatives at the origin of new socio-economic movements. They demonstrate their ability to initiate civic or citizen governance in the absence of recognition

by public authorities. In some cases, the signs of public authority recognition tend to show the influence of the State in terms of intervention and to institutionalize them for the purposes of the State and the market. In an unfavourable eco-system, the solidarity economy initiatives do not take part in the governance and regulation of territorial development since the local public authorities do not involve them in the decision-making process and do not consider them as full-fledged actors of democracy. However, the lack of recognition of local authorities does not seem to be an impassable obstacle to their development. By using reciprocity, they develop a project for calling for a participatory democracy that would have an impact on social, economic, cultural, and sustainable development. Their model of reciprocal self-organization, which they consolidate by using market, non-market, and atypical resources such as human capital, enables them to operate within a broader perspective, which is not limited to localism. As their commitment expands into networks on multiple bases, their environment becomes more favourable to maintain their project. The formal and informal coordination between actors in the same field of activity promotes the strengthening of civic or citizen governance.

## 8. Acknowledgments

We thank Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF) for their financial support.

## 9. References

1. Angeon. V. and Lauro. S. Les pratiques de sociabilité et de solidarité locales: contribution aux enjeux de développement territorial. *Espaces et sociétés*. 2006, 127 (4): 13-31.
2. Bayraktar. U. and E. Massicard. *La décentralisation en Turquie*. Istanbul: AFD, 2011.
3. Buccolo. E., Laville J-L. and Pleyers. G. Introduction. In: J-L. Laville, et al (eds). *Mouvements sociaux et économie solidaire*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. 2017, pp. 7-31.
4. Chaniel P. and Laville. J-L. *L'économie sociale et solidaire en France*. In: J-L. Laville, et al (eds.). *Actions publiques et économie solidaire*. Paris: Edition Eres. 2005, pp.47-74.
5. Chevallier.J. *L'État post-moderne*. Paris, LGDJ: 2008.
6. Demoustier. D. Économie sociale et solidaire et régulation territoriale, Étude sur quatre zones d'emploi en Rhône-Alpes. *Géographie, économie, société*. 2010, 1 (12): 89 à 109.
7. Demoustier. D. and Richez-Battesti. N. Introduction. Les organisations de l'économie sociale et solidaire: gouvernance, régulation et territoire. *Géographie, économie, société*. 2010, 12 (1): 5-14.
8. Di Maggio. P-J. and Powel. W. W. The iron cage revisited: institutionnel isomorphism and collective rationality in organisational fields. *American Sociological Review*. 1983, 48, Avril: 146-160.
9. Ekal. Ş. B. Les foyers pour femmes battues: des institutions d'État. In: M. Aymes, et al (eds.). *L'Art de l'État en Turquie. Arrangements de l'action publique de la fin de l'Empire ottoman à nos jours*. Paris: Karthala. 2013, pp. 173-194.
10. Espagnet. D. Politique publique et autonomie associative: l'Association pour la réadaptation et l'intégration. In: J-L. Laville, et al (eds.). *Association et action publique*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. 2015, pp. 90-107.
11. Fontaine. G. *Les Objectifs de Développement Durable, un référentiel d'action et d'évaluation pour les Pôles Territoriaux de Coopération Economique?*. 2018. hal-01702951.
12. Gardin. L. *Les initiatives solidaires. La réciprocité face au marché et à l'Etat*. Paris: Eres, 2006.

13. Gajac. O. Desertion (Forced) and Reconstruction of Another Society. In: A. E. Erbaş (eds.). *Paradigms and Understanding Social Issues*. London: IJOPEC Publication (IPOJEC Publication. 2018, pp.153-163.
14. Gajac.O. and Akyildiz. S. Cinq ans après Gezi: de la contestation à l'émergence de forms plurielles d'engagement. *Revue Confluences Méditerranée*. (in press).
15. Gendron. C. Émergence de nouveaux mouvements sociaux économiques. *Revue POUR*. 2001, 172:175-181.
16. Haeringer. J. Identifier les logiques institutionnelles. In: F. Traversaz, et al (eds.). *Conduire le changement dans les associations d'action sociale et médico-sociale*. Paris: Dunod. 2002, pp. 9-53.
17. Hillenkamp. I and J-L. Laville. *Socio-économie et démocratie. L'actualité de Karl Polanyi*. Paris: Éditions Eres. 2013.
18. Ion. J. *L'engagement pluriel*. Saint-Etienne: Cresal. 2001.
19. Ion. J. *L'engagement des jeunes*. La revue lacanienne. 2017, 18 (1): 177-184.
20. Itçaina. X. Les régimes territoriaux de l'économie sociale et solidaire: le cas du pays basque français. *Géographie, économie, société*. 2010, 12 (1): 71-87.
21. Klein. J-L., Laville J-L. and Moulaert. F. *L'innovation sociale*. Paris: Eres. 2017.
22. Laville. J-L. and Salomon. A. *Association et action publique*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2015.
23. Laville. J-L., Magnen , J-P.,Carvalho de França Filho G. C. and Medieros. A. *Actions publiques et économie solidaire* Paris: Edition Eres, 2005.
24. Laville. J-L. and Cattini A. D.. *Dictionnaire de l'autre économie*. Paris: Gallimard. 2006.
25. Laville. J-L. *L'économie solidaire. Une perspective internationale*. Paris: Fayard, 2013.
26. Leloup. F., Moyart L. and B. Pecqueur. La gouvernance territoriale comme nouveau mode de coordination territoriale?. *Géographie, économie, société*. 2005, 7 (4): 321-332.
27. Otayek. R. Vu d'Afrique. Société civile et démocratie. De l'utilité du regard décentré. *Revue internationale de politique comparée*. 2002, 2 (9):193-212. DOI 10.3917/ripc.092.0193
28. Massicard. E. Une décennie de pouvoir AKP en Turquie : vers une reconfiguration des modes de gouvernement ?. *Les études du CERI*. 2014, 205: 21-38.
29. Pecqueur. J. *Le développement local*. Paris: Syros, 1989.
30. Petrella. F. and Richez-Battesti. N. Gouvernance et proximité : des formes de participation et de coopération renouvelées ? Une observation sur l'accueil des jeunes enfants en France. *Géographie, économie, société*. 2010, 12 (1): 53-70.
31. Rangeon. F. Société civile: Histoire d'un mot. In: *La société civile*, Paris: PUF. 1986, pp 9-32.
32. Sadik. Y. Les combinatoires associatives au Maroc : une critique des typologies dominantes. in: J-L. Laville, et al (eds.). *Association et action publique*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. 2015, pp. 291-315.
33. Sue. R. *La contre société*. Paris: Les liens qui libèrent, 2016.
34. Svamp. M. La lutte contre l'extractivisme et la défense des biens communs. In: J-L. Laville, et al (eds). *Mouvements sociaux et économie solidaire*. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer. 2017, pp. 31-40.
35. Telseren. A. Occupy Gezi: Est-il possible de penser une rupture durable? *Revue de l'École doctorale* ED 382, 2014, <https://hal-univ-diderot.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01158303/document>.
36. Türkmen. B. L'individualisme solidariste des actrices de Gezi et l'émergence de nouveaux sujets, in jeunes alteractivistes : d'autres manières de faire de la politique ?. *Perspectives internationales*, Paris: Agora débats/jeunesses. 2016, 73 (2), pp. 119-133.

37. Vatin, J-C. Sur l'étendue d'un concept. In: A. Bozzo, et al (eds.). *Les sociétés civiles dans le monde musulman*. Paris: La Découverte TAP / Islam et Société. 2011, pp. 51-68.

---

*Manuscript received: 14.10.2019*

*Manuscript received in revised form: 19.11.2019*

*Manuscript accepted: 20.11.2019*